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Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is conferred on Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. 78-22(3)(j). The case has been transferred to the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Issue Number One:

Whether Trial court used Wrong Standard of

Evidence to dismiss a Federal 1983, 1985 or 1986 claim. The Standard on
Rule 12b Motions to Dismiss was set by the Supreme Court. "Turning to
respondents9 final ground, we hold that under the general principles
laid down in the Steele, Graham, and Howard cases the complaint
adequately set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. In
appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts [355 U.S. 41, 46] in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief."1 The Tenth Circuit has also issued its opinion as to
grounds for relief on a 12b motion stating, "Pro Se Litigants should have
their pleadings reviewed giving them liberal construction. The Utah
Supreme Court has also ruled "A plaintiff is required, under our liberal
1
2

CONLEY v. GIBSON, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)
Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997)
5

standard of notice pleading, to submit a 'short and plain statement...
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and va demand for
judgment for the relief3/" Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 14,
122 P.3d 622 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2)) (omission in original).
"The plaintiff must only give the defendant ffair notice of the nature
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
litigation involved/" 4 Id. (quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656
P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982))/' Given that standard, trial court was in error to
dismiss this claim especially with prejudice, because it is clear that any
deficiencies could be corrected with an additional filing. This court should
review de novo, giving no discretion to the trial courts findings.
Issue Number Two: Whether trial court was in error when it concluded that Plaintiff
had failed to establish a claim under 42, USC 1983 against Defendants. Trial court
concluded that because Defendant Dr. Brown was not a "State Actor" that he could
not act under "color of Authority of State Law" as is required for a 1983 Claim. The
court was correct in concluding that in order to invoke 42 USC 1983 that the actions
of a defendant must be "Under Color of Authority of State Law". The court was
incorrect in concluding that a "Private Person" can not be included in Federal 1983
claims. The US Supreme Court has concluded that "Conduct allegedly causing
3
4

Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 14, 122 P.3d 622
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)
6

the deprivation of a constitutional right protected against infringement
by a State must be fairly attributable to the State. In determining the
question of "fair attribution," (a) the deprivation must be caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by it or by a person for whom it is responsible, and (b)
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly
be said to be a state actor, either because he is a state official, because he
has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State."5
"Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited
action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute. To
act "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer
of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity
with the State or its agents." 6 "Respondent's complaint adequately
alleges conduct "under color o f state law for purposes of 1983, in view
of the conspiracy allegations. Although appointed counsel in a state
criminal prosecution does not act "under color of1 state law in the
normal course of conducting the defense, Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312 , an otherwise private person acts "under color of1 state law
5
6

LUGAR v. EDMONDSON OIL CO., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)
UNITED STATES v. PRICE, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)
7

when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of
federal rights, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 . Pp. 919-920."7
Issue Number Three:

Whether Court committed reversible error when

it concluded that Gender Discrimination does not apply to Claims brought under 42
USC 1985. The US Supreme Court set the standard. The court stated that for 1985
to be invoked the following criteria must be invoked ""To come within the
legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) 'conspire
or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another1 (2) 'for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws.' It must then assert that one or more of
the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, 'any act in furtherance of
the object of [the] conspiracy,1 whereby another was (4a) 'injured in his
person or property1 or (4b) 'deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States/" 403 U.S., at 102-103."8
The Supreme Court has concluded that in order to come under 1985 that
there must be some type of Racial or Class Base discrimination. "The
language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal

7

TOWER v. GLOVER, 467 U.S. 914 (1984)
GREAT AMERICAN FED. S. & L. ASSN. v. NOVOTNY, 442 U.S. 366
(1979)
8

8

privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators' action. 9^The conspiracy, in other words, must
aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law
to all.9 The Court has since ruled that discrimination based upon Gender
does in fact meet the requirement of 1985. "The "animus" requirement
demands at least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their
sex, whereas the record indicates that petitioners' demonstrations are
not directed specifically at women, but are intended to protect the
victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization.
Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a sexbased intent;"10 Since this concerns a rule of law the court should decide
this issue "De Novo", giving no deference to trial court findings.11.
\ISSUE NUMBER FOUR:

Whether court made a reversible error when it

concluded that Plaintiff had failed to allege a Common Law Conspiracy against
Defendant Dr. Brown. To plead a common law conspiracy five elements must be
alleged: "(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished,
(3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more

9

GRIFFIN v. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)
BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA CLINIC, 506 U.S. 263 (1993)
11
Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 88 F3d. 848 (10th Cir. 1996)
10

9

unlawful, or over acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof Since the
court concluded that "The court notes that Plaintiff has not, beyond a very general
"Blanket:" statement, specified which cause of action are to be applied to Dr. Brown
so this court will assume that the Plaintiff is alleging that all the causes of action are
plead against the defendant."

Therefore if Plaintiff pled even one cognizable claim

against any of the defendants, then he has a common law claim for conspiracy
against Dr. Brown. This should be reviewed "De Novo", giving no deference to
trial court findings.14
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case was originally filed in Federal District Court, but was dismissed
because Federal Court concluded that based upon the Roker Feldman and Younger
Doctrine, that it could abstain from taking Jurisdiction because so many of the claims
started from a State Court action. Many of the claims started with a Protective order
and subsequent Divorce between Plaintiff and Defendant Julie Cline. When Federal
Court declined Jurisdiction, Plaintiff filed this action in Third District Court.
Because Judge Hilder was named as a Defendant, the case was transferred to Fourth
District. Several State Defendants have been granted a motion to dismiss, including
the Judge. At that hearing, and in his brief, Plaintiff had made a motion to be

12

Alta Indus. V. Hurst 846 P.2d 1282
Ruling Re" Defendants motion to dismiss first amended complaint pp 996
14
Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 88 F3d. 848 (10th Cir. 1996)
10

allowed to modify the complaint. Court granted the motion to amend the complaint
for Dr. Brown, but denied the motion to amend for claims against Steve Wall. State
Defendants were also dismissed after that hearing. Later, State Defendants made
motion to certify the dismissal order as an appeal able order and that motion was
granted. Plaintiff appealed and the appeal was dismissed on technical grounds. Dr.
Brown requested a second hearing on the amended motion to dismiss and at the
hearing, requested that his issues be certified as final appeasable order. Plaintiff has
appealed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The questions that this court must consider are basically three fold. (1) If Private
Defendants who enter a conspiracy with state workers are acting under Color of Law,
of the purposes of a 1983 Claim. (2) If Private individuals who's conspiracy revolves
around Invidious discrimination on the basis of Sex (gender) is enough to invoke
Federal 1985, and 1986, and (3) if there is enough detail to in Plaintiffs Complaint to
invoke any kind of Conspiracy, whether under State Law, of Federal law.

11

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

Congress, in passing the Fourteenth Amendment and Subsequent 42
USC 1983,1985 and 1986, intended that people who were deprived basic rights and
liberties that are guaranteed by the united states constitution should have some form
of redress through Federal Law.

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . ."15
The Federal Courts have interpreted this to mean that in order to have
a claim based upon 1983, that the defendants must have been operating
"Under Color of Authority of State Law." Generally under Color of
Authority means action by the state. But the Supreme Court has outlined a
number if situations where Private Persons can be held liable under Color of
Authority of State Law.
When private persons conspire with a Judge or Bribe the Judge they
become co conspirators. "The action against the private parties accused
of conspiring with the judge is not subject to dismissal. Private persons,
15

42 USC 1983
12

jointly engaged with state officials in a challenged action, are acting
"under colorff of law for purposes of 1983 actions. And the judge's
immunity from damages liability for an official act that was allegedly
the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge does
not change the character of his action or that of his co-conspirators."16
Persons who have been given power by the state, but are not "State
Actors" are also acting under Color of Authority of State Law. ""Misuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
"under color of state law." And see Screws v. United States, supra, 107111. It is common practice, as we noted in Labor Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Co., 331 U.S. 416, 429 , for private guards or detectives to be
vested with policemen's powers. We know from the record that that is
the policy of Miami, Florida. Moreover, this was an investigation [341 u.s.
97, ioo] conducted under the aegis of the State, as evidenced by the fact
that a regular police officer was detailed to attend it. We need go no
further to conclude that the lower court, to which we give deference on
local law matters, see Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 583 , was
correct in holding that petitioner was no mere interloper but had a

16

. DENNIS v. SPARKS, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)
13

semblance of policeman's power from Florida. There was, therefore,
evidence that he acted under authority of Florida law; and the manner
of his conduct of the interrogations makes clear that he was asserting
the authority granted him and not acting in the role of a private
person."17
When Private individuals use the power of the State Court System in a
way that it denies any person equal protection under the law, they are acting
"Under Color of Authority of State Law". "First, the claimed
constitutional deprivation results from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority, since Leesville would not
have been able to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts without 28
U.S.C. 1870, which authorizes the use of peremptory challenges in civil
cases. Second, Leesville must in all fairness be deemed a government
actor in its use of peremptory challenges. Leesville has made extensive
use of government procedures with the overt, significant assistance of
the government, see, e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 , in that peremptory challenges have no utility
outside the jury trial system, which is created and governed by an
elaborate set of statutory provisions and administered solely by

17

WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES, 341 U.S. 97 (1951)
14

government officials, including the trial judge, himself a state actor,
who exercises substantial control over voir dire and effects [500 U.S.
614, 615] the final and practical denial of the excluded individual's
opportunity to serve on the petit jury by discharging him or her.
Moreover, the action in question involves the performance of a
traditional governmental function, see, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461, since the peremptory challenge is used in selecting the jury, an
entity that is a quintessential governmental body having no attributes of
a private actor. Furthermore, the injury allegedly caused by Leesvillefs
use of peremptory challenges is aggravated in a unique way by the
incidents of governmental authority, see Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 ,
since the courtroom is a real expression of the government's
constitutional authority, and racial exclusion within its confines
compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of
his or her skin. Pp. 618-628"18
Discriminatory practices that otherwise would not subject a private
party to 1983, become attributable to the state when the state court system is
used to accomplish its objective. "Upon full consideration, however, we
have found it unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issue which

18

EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
15

petitioners advance; for we have concluded that judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants by the courts of the District of Columbia is
improper for other reasons hereinafter stated. 6_
Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, derived from 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866,7 provides: f All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is en- [334 U.S. 24 , 31]
joyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell hold, and
convey real and personal property/ 8
All the petitioners in these cases, as found by the District Court, are
citizens of the United States. We have no doubt that, for the purposes of
this section, the District of Columbia is included within the phrase
f

every State and Territory/9 Nor can there be doubt of the

constitutional power of Congress to enact such legislation with reference
to the District of Columbia. 1_0_
We may start with the proposition that the statute does not invalidate
private restrictive agreements so long as the purposes of those
agreements are achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to
the terms. The action toward which the provisions of the statute under
consideration is directed is governmental action. Such was the holding
of Corrigan v. Buckley, supra.

16

In considering whether judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants is
the kind of governmental action which [334 U.S. 24 ,32] the first
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to prohibit,
reference must be made to the scope and purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment; for that statute and the Amendment were closely related
both in inception and in the objectives which Congress sought to
achieve.
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the joint resolution which was
later adopted as the Fourteenth Amendment were passed in the first
session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. 11 Frequent references to the
Civil Rights Act are to be found in the record of the legislative debates
on the adoption of the Amendment. 12 It is clear that in many
significant respects the statute and the Amendment were expressions of
the same general congressional policy. Indeed, as the legislative debates
reveal, one of the primary purposes of many members of Congress in
supporting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
incorporate the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic
law of the land. 13 Others supported the adoption of the Amendment in
order to eliminate [334 U.S. 24 ,33] doubt as to the constitutional
validity of the Civil Rights Act as applied to the States. 14_

17

The close relationship between 1 of the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment was given specific recognition by this Court in
Buchanan v. Warley, supra, 245 U.S. at page 79,38 S.Ct. at page 19,
L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann.Cas.l918A, 1201. There, the Court observed
that, not only through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
also by virtue of the 'statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose,'
including the provisions here considered, a colored man is granted the
right to acquire property free from interference by discriminatory state
legislation. In Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, we have held that the
Fourteenth Amendment also forbids such discrimination where
imposed by state courts in the enforcement of restrictive covenants."19
It is even "Under Color of Authority of State Law" if it is the
"custom" of the state to stand by and watch a private party being
discriminated and the State does nothing. In this case the only state action
used to get private parties enjoined under "Color of State Law" was a
policeman that stood by and let a restaurant owner refuse service to Black
Students. "The involvement of a policeman, a state official, whether or
not his actions were lawful or authorized, in the alleged conspiracy
would plainly provide the state action needed to show a direct violation

19

HURD V. HODGE , 334 U.S. 24 (1948)
18

of petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights entitling her to relief
under 1983, and private persons involved in such a conspiracy are
acting ffunder color" of law and can be liable under 1983, Pp. 150-152."
"Petitioner would have shown an abridgment of her constitutional right
of equal protection if she proved that respondent refused her service
because of a state-enforced custom of racial segregation in public
restaurants."20
From the cases presented above, it is clear that private parties can and
do act "Under Color of Authority of State Law" Trial Court was in error
when it concluded otherwise. The next question is whether Plaintiff has
stated enough for the Defendant Dr. Brown to conclude what is being
alleged.
Federal Case law on 1983 actions is Notice Standard. In other words,
plaintiff only needs to make enough of a claim to establish the basic concept
of what he is claiming. "Failure of the complaint to set forth specific facts
to support its general allegations of discrimination was not a sufficient
[355 U.S. 41, 42] ground for dismissal of the suit, since the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail

ADICKES v. KRESS & CO., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)
19

the facts upon which he bases his claim."

In fact a claim can only be

dismissed if plaintiff can prove "no set of facts in his case" "Turning to
respondents' final ground, we hold that under the general principles
laid down in the Steele, Graham, and Howard cases the complaint
adequately set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. In
appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts [355 u.s. 41,46] in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."22
In Plaintiffs Complaint he made the claim that each defendant
operated under color of authority of State Law.

Plaintiff claimed that he

was denied rights to Family Associations, and Property Rights.24 He alleged
that a conspiracy was organized on or about July of 2001 to deny him rights
guaranteed by the US constitution including home, family and property
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment Guarantees that "No State . . . Shall

CONLEY v. GIBSON, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)
CONLEY v. GIBSON, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)
First Amended Complaint paragraph 22
First Amended Complaint paragraph 25
First Amended Complaint paragraph 28
20

deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
The Supreme Court has failed to define exactly what a Liberty interest is but
it includes bringing up your children, according to the dictates of your own
concessions. "While this court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much
consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."27
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Julie and Sharon conspired to make
false allegations of Child Abuse to deny plaintiff his home and other
property and associations with his children.

There is no doubt that filing

false child abuse reports are illegal. Later the conspiracy was used to take

US Constitution-14 Amendment
MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
First Amended Complaint paragraph 32
21

away plaintiffs Home (property right).

The false allegations were also

used to interfere in Plaintiffs Business.

Plaintiff alleged that it is the

custom of the state and municipalities to deny rights to fathers in domestic
O 1

situations. Plaintiff also alleged that there is a bias against fathers by
DCFS, and law Enforcement officers, and it is the custom to discriminate
against fathers.

Since DCFS and Law Enforcement officers are all State

Workers, or they operate under authority granted by state law, then their
actions are Under Color of Authority of State Law. If any one conspires
with them to perpetituate that discrimination, then even private parties who
have conspired with state workers, used the illegal bias to their advantage in
a state proceeding, or even if the state workers knew about what is
happening and failed to take any action, then the private parties acted "under
Color of Authority of State Law55.
Plaintiff even alleged that it is the custom of District court in Utah to
discriminate against Fathers in Protective Order Situations.

This clearly

violates federal law as the State of Utah received Grant Money from US
Government under 42 USC 110 known as "Family Violence Prevention and
First Amended
First Amended
First Amended
32
First Amended
First Amended

Complaint paragraph
Complaint paragraph
Complaint paragraph
Complaint paragraph
Complaint paragraph
22

33
36
87
34
54

Services", which prohibits states from discriminating on the basis of Gender
or Sex. (42 USC 10406) Because it is the custom of the state to discriminate
then Federal Law allows for a claim on gender discrimination in the seeking
of protective orders. In addition we had a Custody Evaluator Bribed,34 She
was also put up to making fraudulent statements by DSFS workers and the
Guardian ad Litem. Court argued that Custody Evaluator and Guardian ad
Litem is not a State Worker for 1983, but this is false. They are both
appointed by a court order, which makes their actions directly attributable to
state action.
In addition to other issues, Plaintiff was also sentenced to 30 days in
Jail as a result of the conspiracy. There is also a situation in which Steve
Wall, Bob Banta (DCFS WORKER) and attorney from the Guardian ad
Litems office conspired to have DCFS worker perger herself at a contempt
trial, on the condition that after Plaintiff was convicted, that Steve and Julie
would then use the finding of contempt and threat of Jail time to force
Plaintiff to drop his Law suit against Julie, Steve Wall, her parents, and the
State.

i f

That is a perfect claim for abuse of process as well as using the

resources of the state to deny Plaintiff a fair trial.

First Amended Complaint paragraph 61
First Amended Complaint paragraph 76
23

In paragraph 80 -87 Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and
had an illegal search and seizure because he was falsely accused of child
abuse. Even if they had probable cause to investigate, they Cleary lacked
jurisdiction over the incident in question. Again State Workers denying
Plaintiff basic constitutional rights, because DCFS had falsely made him
appear to be a child abuser. To date the state has done nothing to stop the
abuse and discrimination.
From all the above allegations it is very clear that Plaintiff has alleged
enough to establish a conspiracy to deny him basic rights that were done
against him both by state workers, and or in conspiracy with private
individuals. Plaintiff then alleged that Dr. Brown got involved in the
conspiracy. That he had knowledge that Julie was using the children to
continue the illegal discrimination against Plaintiff. That he knew there was
a government investigation to determine if Mr. Packer had assaulted Cline.
That Dr. Brown failed to bring that information to the people that may be
able to help. And he made false allegations to the custody evaluator that
Plaintiffs children were afraid of him. These issues were used to get another
protective order, and to convict Plaintiff of Contempt of Court, and to keep
his children away from him. They were also used to take his home and
Child support away in an action that only the State has the right to do it in.

24

(divorce law). Therefore he also acted under color of authority of State Law
when he participated in the conspiracy.
To establish a claim under 1985 and 1986, the discrimination can be
done by purely private individuals as long as it is directed at Class Based
Invidious Discrimination.36 In addition, if the conspiracy is to infringe
on first amendment rights (like seeking redress against the government)
then 1985 applies as long as the state is a party or the aim is to influence
the activity of the State. "An alleged conspiracy to infringe First
Amendment rights is not a violation of 1985(3) unless it is proved
that the State is involved in the conspiracy or the aim of the
conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State."37 When Steve
Wall, Bob Banta and an unknown attorney from the Attorney Generals
office, conspire to use a state worker to make false allegations, used to
influence the state court system, with the specific intent to deny Plaintiff
his right to seek redress against the government, it clearly qualifies as in
violation of the First Amendment. "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
CARPENTERS v. SCOTT, 463 U.S. 825 (1983)
25

or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
Deprival of First Amendment Rights even includes depriving access
to the court system. "The right of petition is one of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." Id., at 138.
We followed that view in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 669 -671.
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups
of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of
the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third
branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to
all departments of the Government. The right of access to the
courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition. See
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 ; Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546,
549.
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association
and of petition to hold that groups with [404 U.S. 508, 511]
38

United States Constitution - First Amendment
26

common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws,
use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and
courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting
resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their
competitors."39
Court has also concluded that a purely Private conspiracy based upon
gender is not enough to invoke 1985 and 1986. This is also false. The
Supreme Court has ruled that "The "animus" requirement demands at
least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex."40 So
the Supreme Court has already ruled that Gender Discrimination is
actionable even for pure private conspiracies. Several other Federal Courts
have also ruled that Gender Discrimination is actionable in a 1985 claim.41
Plaintiff has clearly alleged enough to establish a 1985 claim for Gender
discrimination even if the claim was purely private individuals. But in this
case, the discrimination also included that state and its workers and so there
is clearly enough to establish a 1985 claim.
Once Plaintiff establishes a 1985, claim just alleging that Dr. Brown
knew about the conspiracy, had some power to stop it and failed to do so
39

CALIFORNIA TRANSPORT v. TRUCKING UNLIMITED, 404 U.S. 508
(1972)
40
BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA CLINIC, 506 U.S. 263 (1993)
41
Lake v. Arnold D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-00245J (Third Circuit 1997)
27

establishes a 1986 claim. "Every person who, having knowledge that any
of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of
this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid
in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if
such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or
his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act,
which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and
such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any
number of persons."42 In fact the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
Defendants didn't even have to participate in the original conspiracy, but
they only had to know about it and fail to do anything to stop it and 1986 can
be invoked. Dr. Brown clearly falls under this category, except that he also
participated directly.
Finally even if there was not enough information to establish a
Federal Law Conspiracy under 1983 or 1985, there is clearly a conspiracy to
abuse process, and for Libel, slander and Fraudulent Transfer of Assets.
All that is needed for an abuse of process claim is The Court of
Appeals recently detailed the requirements for Abuse of Process. "Abuse of
process has two elements: '"First, an ulterior purpose; second, an act in

42

Park v. Atlanta 96-8512 (11 th Circ. 1997)
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the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the
proceedings.1 ff Id. (citation omitted); see also William Prosser, Law of
Torts, § 121, at 857 ("The essential elements of abuse of process . . . have
been stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a willful act in
the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding."43 In that one paragraph Plaintiff alleged that the contempt trial
was done to abuse process in that its purpose was to coerce Plaintiff into
dropping his future claims against Steve Wall, Julie, her parents and the CPS
workers, "the essence of [abuse of process] is a perversion of the process
to accomplish some improper purpose"); Kool v. Lee, 43 Utah 394,134
P. 906,909 (1913) ("fAn abuse of legal process is where it is employed
for some unlawful object not the purpose intended by law/" (citation
omitted)); William Prosser, Law of Torts, § 121, at 856 (4th ed. 1971)
(noting that abuse of process occurs when a "legal procedure has been
set in motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even with
ultimate success, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an
ulterior purpose for which it was not designed"). "The usual case of
abuse of process is one of some form of extortion, using the process to
put pressure upon the other to compel him to pay a different debt or to

43

Hatch v. Davis, 147 P.3d 383 (UT App. 2004)
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take some other action or refrain from it." Again Plaintiff has clearly
stated a claim for abuse of process. Because there was more than one person
involved, it constitutes a conspiracy. If the complaint alleges that Dr. Brown
participated in that conspiracy, he is a co conspirator. If Dr. Brown told the
custody evaluator that Josh was afraid of his father, and he knew that to be
false, it constitutes Slander. When that information was published, it
constitutes Libel. It is very clear that Plaintiff has stated a claim against Dr.
Brown.
But even if Clines Complaint was difficult to read as the court alleged,
Defendants should have filed a Motion for More Definitive Statement, not a
Motion to Dismiss. It is clear that Plaintiff has alleged more than enough to
state a claim against Dr. Brown.

CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff has clearly stated a claim against Dr. Brown, this case
should be remanded to the District Court. Since Cline has already filed a Motion to
Recuse Judge Howard, this case should be re-assigned to another judge. Cline
should be given the opportunity to continue to pursue his claims in this case till he
has a trial, or until both sides reach a settlement.

44

Hatch v. Davis, 147 P.3d 383 (UT App. 2004)
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Respectfully Submitted this/V Day of March,

Earl Cline
Appellant (Pro Se)
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was hand delivered this, cJ> day of March 2008 to:

Tim Dalton Dunn (0936)
Dunn and Dunn
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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IN T H E F O U R T H J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T
U T A H C O U N T Y , STATE O F U T A H
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT

EARL L. CLINEII,
Plaintiff,

Case #050401710
STATE OF UTAH, EDSON F. PACKER and
SHARON B. PACKER, ET ALS.
INCLUDING DEFENDANT DR. KEVIN
BROWN.

Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby
issues the following:
RULING
The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a Civil Rights Complaint in the Third Judicial
District of Utah on March 5, 2005. The case was transferred to this Court after Judge Robert K.
Hilder of the Third District was made a Defendant in the case. While this Court dismissed the
original Complaint it granted leave for the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The Plaintiff
did so on October 27, 2005. On November 23, 2005 Defendant, Dr. Kevin Brown filed a Motion
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. Subsequently, the Court ordered the dismissal of Judge
Hilder, Judge Harding, Anthony Ferdon, Michelle Blomquist, Diane Moore, Christ Forsyth,
Robert Banta, and Mayla Slack fijor

aly I, 2(106. Soon afterward the Plaintiff

CAN ID IT
3

appealed this Court's decision. The case has proceeded both in the appellate courts and m this
Court relative to other defendants over the intervening year. On February 9, 2007 Defendant Dr.
Kevin Brown filed a Request to Submit relative to the November 23, 2005 Motion to Dismiss.
This Court conducted a hearing on March 29, 2007 where both sides presented oral arguments.
The Court now issues its Ruling.
When considering a motion to dismiss the Court accepts the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable
to plaintiff. See, Hebertson v. Willow Creek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996). Therefore
the Court accepts, for purposes of this Motion, the allegations in Plaintiff s Amended Complaint
as true.
The Plaintiff generally alleges violations of several federal and state law, and suggests
tortious conduct on the part of the various defendants. The Court notes that the Plaintiff has not,
beyond a very general "blanket" statement, specified which causes of action are to be applied to
Dr. Brown so this Court will assume that the Plaintiff is alleging that all of the causes of action
are plead against the Defendant1.
1

^|69 of the First Amended Complaint refers to the alleged wrongs against the Plaintiff as
follows:
Valley Mental Health workers including Dr. Kevin Brown also got involved into
the conspiracy. Kevin Brown testified on behalf of the mother that Petitioner was
talking to the children about their mother. Joshua told Kevin that Mother had put
him up to telling Kevin that Mr. Packer hadn't assaulted Petitioner. After Mother
left the room Josh told Kevin Brown that mother was in fact trying to get him to
change his story. Kevin failed to report that incident and refused to bring that
Page 2 of
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However, even with the factual presumptions running in the Plaintiffs favor the Court
cannot, as a matter of law, sustain the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint The Plaintiff has alleged
that certain actions on the part of Dr. Brown constituted a violation of 42 USCA § 1983. This
provision in the Federal Code provide recourse for persons who are deprived of a right under
"color of law" by a government actor. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Brown worked for Valley Mental
Health, but does not allege that Valley Mental Health or Dr. Brown are state actors2. Therefore,
§1983 does not provide a basis in law for action against Dr. Brown and as such the 1983
allegations are unsupported by even the barest of alleged facts.
The Plaintiff has also pursued a claim under 42 USCA § 1985 which addresses
obstruction of justice, witness and jury tampering. While the Plaintiff has alleged that Dr. Brown
"got involved into the conspiracy," the Plaintiff has not alleged facts or law that would indicate
that Dr. Brown was under a legal duty to report information provided to him by the Plaintiffs
son Joshua to the Court. The Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Brown provided testimony on

information into court. Kevin Brown also made false statements to the Custody
Evaluator that he knew to be false when he stated that 'Joshua was afraid of
Plaintiff, and when he told her that4< Alexis had come m and told him a different
story about the assault in Heber." Pie also knew that he was being used by the
mother to document issues between the children and Plaintiff. By his knowing
that he was being used to document for the court the issues between the parties
and failing to document issues against the mothci he became a willing participant
m the conspiracy against Mr. Chne.
2

^|22 of the Amended Complaint reads: "Di. Kevin Brown is a mental health worker for
Valley Mental Health, as an individual and under color of authority of state law, with service at
Valley Mental Health, 1141 E. 3900 S., Salt Lake City, UT 84124 "
Page 3 of
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behalf of the mother. However, how this testimony violated federal, or state law is left unstaled,
and how this testimony, or other acts or omissions are somehow tied to the tampering of
witnesses, or other obstruction of justice is unclear. Simply put, the Amended Complaint fails to
provide sufficient notice to Defendant, Dr. Brown as to how the various federal, or state laws
cited by the Plaintiff give rise to actionable causes based upon Dr. Brown's alleged actions,
words, or omissions.
Finally, the Plaintiff makes a passing reference to an effort to "alienate him from the care
comfort and consortium of his spouse as well as deny him rights to his children." See, Amended
Complain! 1(30. This appears to be a tort claim of civil conspiracy against the Defendant, and at
the March 29, 2007 hearing the Plaintiff rested the bulk of his arguments upon this theory. To
succeed on a civil conspiracy claim a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a combination of two or
more persons. (2) identified an object to be accomplished and (3) a meeting of the mmds relative
to the object or course occurred, (4) which object constituted an unlawful and over act and (5)
resulted in damages to the plaintiff See, Israel v. Cannon, 146 P.2d 785, 790 (Ut. App. 1987).
This Court notes that the Plaintiffs complaint need only include a "short and plain
statement. . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for the
relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2). While that is a generous standard, and while the courts are
directed to construe pleadings so as to do substantial justice, the Court must also see that
defendants are pointed to sufficient facts to put them on notice relative to the claim made against

Page 4 of
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them. In most cases thai statement need not be plead with specificity, but presumably the
Plaintiff is under an obligation to touch upon the bare elements of the alleged cause of action - in
this case civil conspiracy3.
The Amended Complaint fails to meet the notice standard. The Court notes that it
contains no explication as to the Defendant's duty to the Plaintiff, or the damage done by the
breach of that duty4. Neither, does the Amended Complaint state who Dr. Brown conspired with,
or what their common purpose was, or how that purpose damaged the Plaintiff. To provide
adequate notice it seems that a complaint would, at a minimum, touch upon these elements.
As stated, a complaint does not need to set forth facts in detailed specificity to survive a
defendant's motion to dismiss, but a defendant is entitled to clear notice as to what law he/she
has allegedly broken; or what duty he/she has allegedly breached, hi the Amended Complaint the
Plaintiff has alleged that Dr. Brown did something wrong by not disclosing all of Joshua's

2

The Plaintiff argues that as a pro sc litigant the Court should offer him deference relative
to compliance with the Rules of the Court, and the application of the law. The Court notes,
however, the Utah Court of Appeals' statement noting that Mr. Chne is a "frequent litigant at the
district court and appellate court levels and is appropriately charged with knowledge of
applicable procedures. See, Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,1|4, 67 P.3d 1000 ("When an
individual avails [him]self of the judicial machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency on
the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate."). Cline v. Stale, 2007 Ut App 111.
4

Presumably, the Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Brown's failure to disclose all of the
information offered to him by Joshua to the Court would constitute the breach of a duty. But that
conclusion requires supposition on the part of the Court and evidences the insufficiency of the
Amended Complaint.
Page 5 of
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communications to the Court, and made inaccurate statements to the custody evaluator. See,
Amended Complaint, T|69. However, legal duties that would elevate these alleged omissions, or
bad acts, to actionable causes are simply not plead. In short, the Plaintiff has painstakingly set
forth actions that he may view as either illegal, or a breach of duty, but does not set forth
adequate allegations that the law considers the acts or omissions of the Defendant as grounds for
a suit.
A complaint need not be detailed, or even specific, it must provide adequate notice to a
defendant such that he/she is able to mount a defense to the allegations. The Court cannot be
generous to the point of allowing a plaintiff to cast an "overly broad net" in an attempt to engage
the defendant in vague and undefined litigation. Based on the above reasons, the Court hereby
grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and does so with prejudice. The Court certifies this as
a final judgment in this matter.
Dated this [€& day of April, 2007.

Page 6 of
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
April, 2007 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:
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day of

by U.S. first class mail
Gregory B. Wall
Wall & Wall
4460 South Highland Drive #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84124

Plaintiff Pro Se:
Earht^Cline II
2220 Eart^g^South, #225
Eeffiday, UT 841

Clifford C. Ross
Dunn & Dunn
200 South 505 East, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Earl L. Cline II
2225 East 4800 South, #225
Holliday,UT84117
EasLLCline II
1565^5t^20tTSouth
Salt-Lake Otyrm^4121
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u.
Deputy Court Clerk

2600 South
CityT0T*4Q£5
Peggy E. Stone
Steve A. Combe
Utah Attorney General's Office
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Shawn D. Turner
Larson & Turner
1218 West South Joi'dan Parkway, Unit
B
South Jordan, UT 84095
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Attorneys for Defendant Kevin Brown

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

EARLL. CLINE II,
Plaintiff pro se
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, EDSON F. PACKER and
SHARON B, PACKER, ET ALS. ,
INCLUDrNG DEFENDANT DR. KEVIN
BROWN
Defendants.

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND
UPON THE MERITS OF ALL
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DR.
KEVIN BROWN

Civil No. 050401710 CR
Honorable Fred D. Howard

This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 29, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. Clifford C.
Ross of Dunn & Dunn, P.C. appeared for Dr. Kevin Brown. Earl L. Cline II, Plaintiff pro se,
appeared on his own behalf. Before the Court was the written Motion of Defendant Dr. Kevin
Brown to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Earl L. Cline II with prejudice and
upon the merits. Also before the Court was the verbal motion made by counsel for Defendant
Dr. Kevin Brown in open court and during the hearing that the Court expressly determine that

there is no just reason for delay direct and expressly direct that final judgment enter on all
claims of Dr. Kevin Brown and Plaintiff in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b). The Court
made its written ruling filed April 10, 2007 after having carefully considered the oral
argument by the parties and all pertinent memoranda and other papers on file. Being fully
informed, the Court now ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows:
1.

The motion of Dr. Kevin Brown is well taken and is granted.

2.

Plaintiffs complaint, all amendments thereof, and all other claims of Plaintiff

against Dr. Kevin Brown are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
3.

The Court in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b) expressly determines that there

is no just reason for delay and expressly directs that this be entered as the final order and
judgment disposing of all claims of

Plaintiff Earl S. Cline II against Defendant Dr. Kevin

Brown.

SO ORDERED and ADJUDGED.

Dated this £ ?

day of

<^^iy^

2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this /<*

day of April, 2007 I caused true and correct copies of the

foregoing to be served by first class, postage prepaid, upon:
Earl L. Cline II
Plaintiff pro se
5128 West 12600 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84065
Earl L. Cline II
Plaintiff prose
2225 East 4800 South #225
Holliday.UT 84117
Peggy E. Stone
Steve A. Combe
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Shawn D. Turner
Larson & Turner
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Unit B
South Jordan, UT 84095
Gregory B. Wall
Cory Wall
" "
""
Wall & Wall
4460 South Highland Drive, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Stephen W. Owens
Epperson & Rencher, P.C.
Crandall Bldg., Suite 500
lOWest 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84] 01
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Earl Cline
(Pro Se)
5128 W 12600 S
Herriman, UT 84065
568-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO COURT
First Amended
CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
UNDER 42 U.S.C 1983, & 1985
and other pendant state claims

Earl L. Cline II
Plaintiff
Vs.

State of Utah, et. al., including employees
listed as various does below,
&

Edson F. Packer and Sharon B. Packer, et al
& Julie Camp, aka Julie Cline, & Dr.
Natalie Malovich et.al., & Steve Wall, et al.
& Vicki Sharp & Dr. Kevin Brown, & Associated Clinical and Counceling & Wall and
Wall & Fred Bobo & Wasatch County Sheriffs office, & Officer Zeila Reid, & Dean
Evans, &
Does 1-40

CIVIL NO.
JUDGE:

050401710
Howard

Defendant(s)

Plaintiff, Pro Se, hereby complains and allege of Defendant(s) as follows:
This claim was original filed in Third District court and has been transferred to Fourth
District Court.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is appropriate. This claim includes a previous claim filed against Dr.
Malovich and Associated Clinical and Counseling Psychologists Claim #04093539. It
was dismissed pending a hearing allegedly required by Utah Medical Malpractice act.

1

Utah Court of appeals stated that claim could be re-filed within one year. Claim also
includes a claim filed against State of Utah and numerous other state employees, which
was filed on December 28, 2004 in Federal District Court. (#2:04 CVOl 187 DAK) Claim
was dismissed by Federal Court because some of the claims are "inextricably Intertwined
with State Court Issues". Federal Court declined to take jurisdiction and it is now being
filed in state court. Because claim includes claims against state district court judge and
Guardian ad Litems, Plaintiff intends to move for change of venue.
In addition some of the claims including specifically against DCFS and Chris
Forsyth were partially presented in Case number 040911905, which was dismissed
against state and Chris Forsyth. Case is currently in court of appeals (20041112).
Because original claims against State could not be brought against individual state
workers except for Chris Forsyth, Governmental immunity act states that if case against
State is dismissed, a claim can then be brought against the individual state workers. Part
of this claim includes that various state workers who were negligent in their duties
surrounding many of the issues presented in this claim.
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff, Earl L. Cline II, is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
1565 E. 7200 So., Salt Lake City, Utah., 84121

2.

Defendant(s), State of Utah, upon information and belief, is a State as
authorized under and within the authority of the United States Constitution.
Service upon Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, 160 E. 300 So., 6th floor, P.O.
Box 140833, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. Does 1 - 20, are all employees of
or private individuals, and or divisions within the state government, working

2

under some protection as granted by state law or by direct authority of the
State of Utah, and are all/or were acting under authority of the State or under
Color of Authority of State Law. Some may have exceeded protection
granted by Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and may be sued as an
individual as well as under Color of Authority of State Law. (U.C.A. 63-30-3)
Any not named at this time will be properly enjoined by motion as their names
and other relevant facts are made known. Per dismissal of previous claim
against State and DCFS, this claim is for injunctive and declaratory relief
against the state only. Individual employees listed as Doe's are as individuals
and under color of authority.
3.

Doe Number One is the Department of Human Services, Division of Child
and Family Services, AKA Child Protective Services, AKA DCFS and AKA
CPS, a division of the State of Utah, for declaratory and injunctive relief, with
service upon the Mark Shurtleff as stated above and DCFS at 120 N. 200 W.,
P.O. Box 45500, Salt Lake City, UT 84145.

4.

Doe Number Two is Robyn Arnold-Williams, an employee of the state of
Utah and under color of authority of state law, as an individual, with service
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above, and DCFS as stated above.

5.

Doe Number Three is Judge Sheleigh Harding, as an employee of the State of
Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Administrative Law Judge
For Department of Human Services, with service upon Mark Shurtleff as
stated above and DCFS as stated above.

3

Doe Number Four is Diane Moore, as an individual and as an employee of the
State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child
and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above.
Doe Number Five is Chris Forsyth, as an individual and as an employee of the
State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child
and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above.
Doe Number Six is Robert Banta AKA Bob Banta, as an employee of the
State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child
and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above.
Doe Number Seven is Mayla W. Slack, as an individual and as an employee
of the State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of
Child and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with
service upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above.
Doe Number Eight is Heather Godfrey, as an employee of the State of Utah
and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child and Family
Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service upon Mark
Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above.
Doe Number Nine is Third District Court, a division of the State of Utah, for
injunctive and declaratorily relief only, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as
Stated above and upon Third District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative

4

Office of the Courts, 450 S. State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT,
84114.
12.

Doe Number Ten is Anthony Fredon esq., Guardian ad Litem, as an
individual, and as a quasi officer of the court, under Color of Authority of
State Law, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as Stated above and upon Third
District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative Office of the Courts, 450 S.
State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT, 84114.

13.

Doe Number Eleven is Michelle Bloomquist esq., Guardian ad Litem, as an
individual, and as a quasi officer of the court, under Color of Authority of
State Law, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as Stated above and upon Third
District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative Office of the Courts, 450 S.
State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT, 84114.

14.

Doe Number Twelve is The Honorable Judge Robert K. Hilder, District Court
Judge, for Third District Court of and for the State of Utah, under Color of
Authority of State Law, for damages for administrative actions and for
injunctive relief, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as Stated above and upon
Third District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative Office of the Courts, 450
S. State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT, 84114.

15.

Any remaining Doe's will be named at a later time as additional information
becomes available.

16.

Defendant(s) Edson F. Packer and Sharon B. Packer are married but are
individuals for the purpose of this action, in association with the State of Utah
and under Color of Authority of State Law. Service is upon them individually
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at 915 S. 4800 E., P.O. box 638, Heber, UT 84032, and includes various
entities with which defendants the Packers, conduct business and include; the
Edson F. Packer Trust, and the Sharon B. Packer Trust, SHED partners, a
partnership under their direction.
17.

Defendant(s) Julie Camp is AKA Julie P. Cline, AKA Julie M. Packer.
Service is at 915 S. 4800 E., P.O. Box 638, Heber, UT 84032.

18.

Associated Clinical and Counseling Psychologists is a corporation licensed
under the laws of the State of Utah, with service upon David Dodgin at 5691 S
Redwood Rd., Suite 15, Taylorsville, UT 84123.

19.

Dr. Natalie Malovich is an individual, and under color of authority of state
law, with service at, 5691 S Redwood Rd., Suite 15, Taylorsville, UT 84123.

20.

Vicki Sharp is purported to be an employee of Associated Clinical and
Counseling Psychologists as an individual, and under color of authority of
state law, with service at 5691 S. Redwood Rd., Suite 15, Taylorsville, UT
84123.

21.

Steve Wall is purported to be an individual licensed to practice law in and by
the laws of the state of Utah. Various does include Wall and Wall, as well as
Steven Wall P.C., both of which the exact nature of the ownership entity are
not known, but will be made available upon motion. Service is upon Steve
Wall, at Wall & Wall, 4460 South Highland Dr., Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
UT 84117.
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22.

Dr. Kevin Brown is a mental health worker for Valley Mental Health, as an
individual and under color of authority of state law, with service at Valley
Mental Health, 1141 E. 3900 S., Salt Lake City, UT, 84124

23.

Any other doe's not specifically named at this time will be named upon
motion, or as other court rules may allow, when that information becomes
available.
General Allegations

24.

The issues began as a Protective Order case and quickly turned into a Divorce
Case as well as many other complaints and violations of various state laws.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a judgment is obtained
through Fraud that a new complaint can be filed to overturn the original
judgment. Plaintiff Julie Cline filed a Protective Order on or about March 1,
2002. In it she, through fraud obtained control of Children, Home and all
other marital assets of her and Plaintiff. The protective order soon became a
Divorce and the Fraud continued throughout the case.

25.

Federal Law provides that when the state or other individuals under color of
authority of state law interfere in denying rights guaranteed to individuals
through the constitution, and through invidious discrimination, those deprived
of those rights to family associations, including specifically marriage and
raising children, property rights have a claim through federal law.

26.

Utah State law provided for tort damages for anyone interfering in or
attempting to alienate the affections of a person from their spouse and or
children.
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27.

Under Doctrine of Pendant Jurisdiction, Federal courts can adjudicate state
claims when they are intertwined with federal claims. Because Federal Court
has declined Jurisdiction, Claims now must be heard in State Court.

28.

A civil conspiracy as defined by 42 U.S. C. 1985 was organized on or about
July of 2001, with its purpose to deny plaintiff rights guaranteed by the united
states constitution, as well as its various amendments, and the laws of the
United States and the laws of the state of Utah. Its purpose specifically was to
deny Plaintiff rights to his home, family, and other property rights, and to
alienate him from the affections of his spouse and his children.

29.

All defendants are purported to have operated in violation of The United
States Constitution, many laws of the United States, the State of Utah and
various other laws, and under color of authority of state law.

30.

Defendants are purported to have violated the following laws in furtherance of
its illegal conspiracy or aided others in violating them including but not
limited to the following: First, Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, Federal Laws including; 42 U.C.A. 667, 42
U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 18U.S.C. 1581 and 1589. In addition, the
following state laws were also violated in furtherance of its illegal conspiracy,
including: Utah Code Annotated, (UCA) 30-6-4.3, UCA 77-36-1, UCA 78-719, various Utah Laws related to Determining Child Support, various laws
related to Protective Orders, and various laws related to Divorce. These
violations of the law were done to violate Petitioners rights to equal protection
under the law, and were done to discriminate against him because of his
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gender, and to alienate him from the care comfort and consortium of his
spouse as well as deny him rights to his children.
First Cause of Action
Civil conspiracy to deprive rights as guaranteed under the fourteenth
amendment and other federal laws, and under Color of Authority of State Law
31.

Plaintiff reaffirms and realleges paragraphs 1 - 30 as though set forth fully
herein.

32.

On or about July of 2001, Defendant Julie Camp, and Sharon Packer
conspired to falsely accuse Plaintiff of spouse abuse as Sharon admitted that
Plaintiff had never done anything physically to her daughter Julie, but still
encouraged her to get a protective order to "keep him away from the house",
and his children. At that time Julie decided not to do it because it would "only
make him (Plaintiff) mad".

33.

During that same month, Defendant Steve Wall was brought into the illegal
conspiracy, when he spoke with Plaintiff about representing him and
Defendant Julie, in a divorce action. Steve agreed to represent both parties in
an uncontested divorce and at that point was told all sorts of confidential
information about counseling, employment and other issues related to the
divorce by Plaintiff. Steve was encouraged to by Defendant Sharon to tell her
all of the information that plaintiff had told to him. This was in violation of
his Rules of Lawyer Conduct. Because of this he should have disqualified
himself from further involvement in the case, but didn't, because as he
admitted in court on December 17, 2003, he had a substantial financial interest
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in the case. Throughout the case he also allowed and allegedly encouraged his
client Julie to continue to commit perjury and to file knowingly false
affidavits and other forms of deceit and abuse of process. Steve helped Julie
and her parents, Defendants Edson and Sharon Packer to sell marital home
owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cline to be sold to Packers without Mr. Cline's
knowledge or permission. This was in violation of UCA 25-6, the fraudulent
transfers of assets. Later Steve allowed Mr. Packer, who was not Steve's
Client to testify in court that he believed that the Laytham Way home really
belonged to him and Clines were renting it from him. Steve absolutely knew
that those claims were false and fraudulent. He has an affirmative duty from
Rule 3.3 to disclose his client's fraudulent actions.
On or about November 23, 2001 Defendants Sharon Packer, Julie Cline and
Steve Wall conspired to fraudulently accuse Plaintiff of spouse abuse so as to
get him out of the home and get control of children. West Jordan Police were
called to document a "Non Violent" disagreement between Plaintiff and
Defendant Julie Cline. Later they decided to wait till after the holidays to
fraudulently accuse Plaintiff of Abuse. Defendant Julie confirmed that she
and her mother had spoken with Steve and he encouraged her to wait till after
Christmas, but according to Julie he stated, we can get Earl out any time we
decide to. Steve tried to hide from the court, the fact that he had spoken to
other defendants that time. Steve Julie, and Sharon all knew of the complete
falsity of the information that was being presented to court in the protective
order. Steve instructed Julie to use the services of legal aid to try and avoid
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his obligation to disclose the fraudulent acts of his clients. Steve also knew
that there was an underlying bias against fathers by DCFS, workers and Law
Enforcement officers in Utah and that it is a generally accepted practice within
the organizations to discriminate against Fathers in these types of situations.
Prior to Steve's involvement in this case the police were never called against
Plaintiff for any situation in the previous 16 years of marriage. In the first 2
years after Steve's involvement the police and DCFS were called over 35
times with false allegations.
In February of 2002 Defendant Sharon contacted Lorna Cline, mother of
Plaintiff, by phone from Hawaii, to try to get her to engage in helping Sharon
to deprive plaintiff of his property rights and other civil rights. Lorna told
Sharon to stay out of the marriage. She also contacted a dentist that Plaintiff
was using to treat the children so as to encourage him not to treat the Cline
children. Sharon could then force Plaintiff to sell his car to her.
On or about February 27, 2002 Sharon was angry at Plaintiff, for refusing to
sell her his car and so the very next day or thereabouts, after returning from
Hawaii, put defendant Julie up to again filing a false Protective Order in order
to deny plaintiff of his rights to associations with his children, destroy his
business which he had ran out of the home, and to conspire to take away rights
to his home and other property. This time Julie went through with it. All of
the allegations that she made about Plaintiff abusing son Robert (14) at that
time were proven false. An affidavit from Plaintiffs sister shows that Julie
had known that she was going to get a protective order against Plaintiff even
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before the alleged event that she used to get the order, suggesting that she was
again making up things to use to deprive Plaintiff his rights.
37.

Because of the Febuary 28, 2002, ex party protective order, Child protective
services and the Guardian ad Litem were ordered to investigate any
allegations that Plaintiff had abused his children. The report came back
negative and the protective order was dismissed.

38.

With the filing of an April 11, 2002 divorce by Julie, she made up more false
allegations as well as used allegations that had been previously ruled on by
other Judges and dismissed, against Plaintiff. CPS worker Chris Forsyth and
GAL Michelle Bloomquist entered the conspiracy, by falsely making up new
allegations of abuse against Plaintiff, claiming that they had been told that
information by plaintiffs children.

39.

Chris Forsyth knew the allegations were un-true as she was the same one that
investigated the allegations against Plaintiff earlier. She pretended that she
hadn't previously investigated and un-substantiated the allegation that
Plaintiff had abused Robert, just three weeks before. She then violated a
number of laws in order to hide her illegal actions including perjuring herself
in two court actions. The perjury was documented in an October 17, 2003
hearing on the abuse charges. Guardian ad Litem Michelle Bloomquist
participated by making up a false allegation that the court had ordered a new
investigation, when in fact they had not. GAL Anthony Ferdon knew the
fraud and misrepresentation of the CPS worker and Michelle, but failed to do
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anything about it. By his knowledge of the conspiracy and failure to stop it he
also became a willing participant in the fraud.
40.

During the next year many other CPS workers entered and participated in the
illegal conspiracy. In every one of CPS actions after that all decisions made
by workers were done to discriminate against Plaintiff because of his sex, and
to deny him equal protection under the law. The discrimination caused
plaintiff to spend several days in hearings, and trials defending himself against
false allegations and ultimately they were used against him to bias and
prejudice the divorce court, even though they were all proven to be false.

41.

The remaining CPS workers were listed above and each one discriminated
against plaintiff and or denied him equal protection under the law and as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution. They either
failed to take action to protect cline children from Julie, and or Sharon Packer,
by failing to do anything about their behavior, or they made up false and
fraudulent allegations about Plaintiff. All details of the specific incidents will
be brought up in trial.

42.

Mayla Slack lied about the fact that minor child Chris (13) had told her about
when Julie hit him with a belt. She also failed to substantiate against Julie and
Sharon Packer for leaving a bruise on minor Child Erika (5) when Erika, Ciera
and Josh all provided testimony that grandma Packer had spanked them and
left a bruise. There were even pictures of the bruise provided to Mayla. She
also caught Sharon Packer lying about spanking Erika but did nothing about
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that, instead she leveled allsorts of false allegations against Petitioner. Mayla
and Chris Forsyth both work directly for Dianne Moore.
43.

Dianne knew of the false report that Chris was making in which she was
making up allegations that the Cline children were alleged to have said in
order to discredit plaintiff in the divorce. Dianne had specific knowledge of
the events as Plaintiff talked to her several times early on while CPS was
supposed to be investigating the allegation that plaintiff had abused Robert.
Dianne was the one that told plaintiff of the fact that Chris wouldn't
substantiate against him because the children had told Chris that there wasn't
any bruising. Dianne, Chris and Mayla all were very involved in making up
substantial fraudulent misrepresentations about the facts surrounding the
alleged abuse of the Children.

44.

Chris Forsyth got caught lying in court under sworn testimony. For sure Chris
has exceeded her protection granted by the State Governmental Immunity act,
and Dianne and Mayla have most assuredly done the same. They should be
personally liable for their torts. Bob Banta got involved early on and certainly
knew of Plaintiffs concerns about Dianne Moore's team as Plaintiff met with
him and played a tape of Josh and Christopher stating that they never told
Chris Forsyth that they were ever bruised in any way. He certainly could have
done a lot to stop the fraud, but plaintiff has no direct proof that he was
involved in planning or actually perpetrating the fraud.

45.

Heather Godfree first interviewed Minor Child Alexis (17) then when Alexis
was put up to making false allegations that she had been sexually abused by
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petitioners brother when she was six years old. In the process of her
investigation, Heather knew or should have known that Alexis was put up to
lie for her mother Julie. The evidence was overwhelming that Alexis was
being asked to make up that fact, when less than six months earlier Alexis had
told Chris Forsyth that "Alan doesn't do anything to make me feel
uncomfortable". That alone should have been enough for Heather to have
concluded that Alexis was put up to do this, but in addition, Alexis also
identified the time period of when it was supposed to have happened and also
identified the fact that her cousins Ben, Steven and her Brother Robert were
all there at the time. The problem with Alexis testimony is that during that
time period, Ben and Steven were living clear across the country in Georgia
and were never in a situation in which Alexis and the four boys could have
been abused.
Later Heather was given testimony by Chris about a time when his mom,
(Julie) had wrapped his hands, legs and mouth in Duck Tape. There was also
an incident in which Julie threw Chris on the bed and injured his shoulder.
Both should have been used as abuse against Julie but again because of her
gender nothing was done to Julie.
Edson and Sharon Packer continued to make false allegations against plaintiff
in order to further tie his hands in defending against there onslaught of false
allegation and to bias other court actions so they could get access to Plaintiffs
home and other property, and to destroy his relationship with his children. A
pattern developed where they, including Julie would make up a false

15

allegation, get an ex party order, and even though it would be dismissed, they
would go to another court or judge and state that plaintiff had done things that
he had previously gotten dismissed, in order to get new orders and new cases
against him. This was in violation of state law, which prohibits bringing the
same issue multiple times before different judges and also the legal principle
of res judicata. Several protective orders were sought as well as a civil
stalking injunction and they were dismissed; yet they continued to use the
same incidents over and over to get new charges against Plaintiff.
48.

The Packers and Julie also made false allegations about loans and other
fraudulent statements all designed to discredit plaintiff in divorce court and to
deprive him of rights to his children and property rights.

49.

Steve Wall participated in and purportedly encouraged this illegal action
knowing that divorce court in Utah would side with a mother over a father
when unable to ascertain the truthfulness of allegations. Rule 3.3 and other
rules of attorney conduct give him an affirmative obligation to disclose
conduct or allegations he knows to be false. He became a willing participant
in the fraud when he failed to disclose such to court.

50.

Because of all the false allegations, Court ordered several orders related to
minor child Robert in which court lacked jurisdiction because of Roberts's
involvement with the Juvenal court. Julie, Sharon and the Guardian ad Litem
pushed for all the orders. Because of these orders plaintiff had to move from
his home for a second time in about three months. He had to move his
business, and all his personal belongings. The allegations used to get the
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court to make the orders were false, previously ruled upon by other courts and
or judges, and court lacked jurisdiction. Steve Wall, Michelle Bloomquist and
Anthony Ferdon all knew of the previous Jurisdiction of Juvenal Court with
regards to Robert and the order for him to live in with Plaintiff in the paternal
grandparents home. All had an obligation to inform the court of that
jurisdiction. (Rule 3.3) None of them did and in fact Steve helped his client try
to hide it.
51.

This second move impacted plaintiffs ability to continue to make a living as
well as his having to continually defend him self from new fraudulent
allegations. Once the orders were made, they were almost impossible to make
them go away even when plaintiff proved that they were illegal, un-necessary
and discriminatory. This is all part of the process by which the court in Utah
deprives men of their rights, by allowing women to make up false allegations
of abuse, and even after they are proven false, the repercussions continue to
follow in the courts system.

52.

Steve Wall and (GAL) Michelle are both attorneys and should have known
that orders were illegal for lack of jurisdiction. State law states they should be
held in contempt of court for continually seeking order from a different court
after they were previously ruled upon in another court.

53.

In June of 2002, Julie, Sharon and Steve Wall conspired to file a false
affidavit stating that plaintiff had made almost ten times more income then he
actually did in order to sway the divorce judge to increase child support over
what plaintiff could pay. Court including the Honorable Commissioner Evans

17

issued a child support order that was in violation with Federal and State laws
regarding child support orders. Subsequent to that when plaintiff came back
to modify that order when additional children came to live with petitioner,
court refused to adjust child support downward. Later plaintiff was convicted
of contempt of court for failing to pay all the child support ordered even
though he continued to maintain that the order was to high and was illegal.
Plaintiff spent close to 30 days in jail for this and the appellate court should
overturn the contempt order because it is considered to be a void order by the
appellate court. Again these were done to discriminate against plaintiff
because of his sex and to prevent him from equal protection under the law.
Plaintiff filed two protective orders against defendant Julie, for abusing their
children and both were denied, even though the events fit the legal definition
of abuse. The Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis, coincidentally, reviewed both
of them and denied them both. In the second one, she even denied plaintiff a
right to a hearing as is required by state law. Defendant Julie had three
protective orders applied for and two were issued for situations that were even
on their face, much less abusive than the situations in which plaintiff was
turned down for them. This is further evidence that district court in Utah is
biased against fathers, when it comes to divorce and protective orders. In
reality she even made up the stuff that she was using to get those protective
orders, but Utah will not prosecute women for lying to get a protective order.
With each protective order, plaintiff lost significant rights to his children and
or property rights.
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At a November 22, 2002 hearing in DCFS court presided over by
Administrative Law Judge Shellie Harding, to have substantiation of
allegation that plaintiff abused Robert overturned, all members of the Cline
family, including Julie (camp), and four of the cline children testified that they
had never seen a bruise on minor son Joshua (11). Because the testimony was
so overwhelming that CPS worker Chris Forsyth had made up the allegation
that Josh had told her that he had been bruised by petitioner with a belt, ALJ
Shellie Harding, made up the allegation that "Joshua's injuries had occurred in
California". There was absolutely no testimony to support that allegation.
This was a blatant effort on the part of DCSF to cover for CPS/DCFS worker
Chris Forsyth after she got caught making up fraudulent information against
plaintiff. This evidences that when a state worker decides to violate state laws
and use their authority under color of authority, to break laws and violate
rights that the state has the ability to continue perpetrating the fraud by getting
other employees to cover for them.
Dr. Natalie Malovich and Associated Clinical and Counseling Psychologists
became involved when a custody evaluation was ordered. Dr. Malovich was
ordered to do that. In the beginning of the evaluation she seemed to be very
fair and had an open mind about the situations. Several times she stated that
she would call Michelle Bloomquist and make sure that she was told about
Julie doing a great deal of manipulating of the children to get them to testify
against their father. In the end Petitioner and Dr. Malovich got in a
disagreement about billing and She then turned on Plaintiff.
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She produced a

fraudulent report in which she blamed Plaintiff for all the problems of the
divorce as well as blaming him for things that he didn't even do. She also
failed to report many of the issues that she knew Julie had been involved in
and knew Julie was manipulation the children's testimony.
She concluded that Plaintiff had a longstanding personality disorder involving
narcissism. The fact that she used narcissism is evidence of her gender bias,
as narcissism is almost exclusively a male personality disorder. Plaintiff
contends that he doesn't meet the requirements needed by DSM-IV needed to
establish the disorder, but even if he did, Dr. Malovich still failed to diagnose
Julie as having a Personality disorder when she met at least seven of the
required diagnostic criteria for a Dependant Personality Disorder, and there
was substantial evidence that Julies issues actually started when she was still a
young child. DSM-IV requires only five of the traits. Utah Law prohibits
psychological evaluations from being used in a divorce in which all the issues
used to determine a disorder came from situations after the divorce started.
Dr. Malovich did testing on both Julie and Plaintiff. She claimed that her
testing of Mr. Cline revealed a personality disorder. She claimed that there
was no evidence in her testing that Julie had any evidence of a personality
disorder. Both were fraudulent as Plaintiffs testing came back showing no
evidence of any disorder. Julies testing showed considerable probability of a
disorder. There are also many other examples that will be brought out at trial
to illustrate that She discriminated against Plaintiff because of his gender and
conspired to deprive him of equal protection under the law. She was most
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assuredly put up to this by GAL, Michelle Bloomquist who got herself
involved in the conspiracy early on and needed someone to blame all the
issues on Plaintiff so as to make it harder for him to come after her and the
other parties to this conspiracy. Dr. Malovich also does considerable contract
work with DCFS and was put up to this by someone high up in that office.
60.

Defendant Vicki Sharp was put up to making fraudulent allegations that she
had heard Mr. Cline speak to his children over the phone and he was saying
negative things about there mother. Dr. Malovich knew that the allegations
were false because her own records showed that Robert was in D.T. and Chris
and the other children were in Heber with there Grandparents. Dr. Malovich
and Associated Clinical Counseling Psychologists have an obligation to
supervise her and they failed to do so. They also are probably liable through
Respondent Superior.

61.

Dr. Malovich also violated a contract with Mr. Cline in which she agreed to a
financial contract and then billed almost 4 times as much as agreed upon. She
got the court to order her billing paid and as such used her influence with the
court to illegally deprive Plaintiff of rights to property. Defendant Sharon
Packer also bribed Dr. Malovich. She also may have had an illegal
conversation with Judge Hilder about him wanting psychological evaluation
don on Plaintiff to determine "what was driving him".

62.

With the filing of Divorce Julie and Plaintiff both claimed Laytham Way
home was Marital Property. Shortly after filing of Protective order,
Defendant Julie signed an $80,000 trust deed against the home, to her parents.
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After she had borrowed all the equity, she then sold the home to her dad. She
kept position and continued to live there. The transfer was fraudulent and met
the requirements for Fraudulent Transfers of Assets as defined by Utah law.
Later the both testified in court that the home was not marital property. Court
gave property to the Packers even though they were not parties to the divorce
and there was no legal basis to give them the home. The purpose was to
frequently deny Plaintiff to his share of the equity in the home.
63.

Because of all the actions of various defendants in the divorce and the other
surrounding cases, the real motive was to deny Plaintiff rights guaranteed by
the thirteenth amendment by taking away all his assets, getting court to order
support payments that were extremely high in relation to his income, as well
as ordering payment of Defendant attorney fees. This is alleged to be in
violation of Thirteenth Amendment as well as federal peonage laws.

64.

Many different court cases were filed against Plaintiff without any real basis
for them. This is alleged to be malicious prosecution and or abuse of process.

65.

Numerous times Julie called the West Jordan Police and fraudulently alleged
that she had a Protective Order against Plaintiff and they then came out to the
home. Never once would the police document that she was making false
Reports. Various West Jordan Police officers will be enjoined into this case
as doe's, by motion as names and dates become available.

66.

Twice reports were made to Wasatch County Sheriffs office and the officer
investigating the incidents refused to do anything about assault charges. Both
times Julie, Mr. and Mrs. Packer and their children including Neil Packer,
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Bart Packer and Kelly Packer were asked to lie to police about the incidents.
The incident that occurred on June 14, 2003, at the Packer home in Heber,
UT, and the officer was Negligent and ether knew or should have known that
Packers were lying. He also failed to interview the Cline children who were
all witness to the assault on plaintiff. Those officers will be named as
additional dos as their names and information can be ascertained.
Various neighbors were also used to make fraudulent allegations against
Plaintiff. John Bartlet was asked to call the police and accuse plaintiff of
steeling his own car. Fred Bobo was asked to make a fraudulent claim that
Petitioner had violently assaulted Julie. He either knew the claims were
fraudulent or had no basis to make the accusations. They may also be
enjoined as additional doe's as further information becomes available.
Several South Salt Lake City police officers responded to a call at Salt Lake
County Juvenal Receiving Center, when Julie had represented that she had a
protective order against Plaintiff. Julie was trying to get oldest son Robert to
come and live with her in violation of Juvenal Court order. Julie lied and
stated that there wasn't a custody order regarding Robert. Police officers
knew or should have known that there was and should have given Robert back
to Plaintiff. They instead gave Robert back to his mother. When Mr. Cline
stated he was going to go to get a copy of the custody order, they sent Julie
and Robert home and called West Jordan Police to have them stop Mr. Cline
from getting custody of Robert. That action is enough to establish Malice. By
there illegal actions they involved themselves in the illegal conspiracy. They
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will be enjoined by motion into this action as Doe's when further information
becomes available.
Valley Mental Health workers including Dr. Kevin Brown also got involved
into the conspiracy. Kevin Brown testified on behalf of the mother that
Petitioner was talking to the children about their mother. Joshua told Kevin
that Mother had put him up to telling Kevin that Mr. Packer hadn't assaulted
Petitioner. After Mother left the room Josh told Kevin Brown that mother
was in fact trying to get him to change his story. Kevin failed to report that
incident and refused to bring that information into court. Kevin Brown also
made statements to the Custody Evaluator that he knew to be false when he
stated that "Joshua was afraid of Plaintiff', and when he told her that "Alexis
had come in and told him a different story about the assault in Heber". He
also knew that he was being used by the mother to document issues between
the children and Plaintiff. By his knowing that he was being used to
document for the court the issues between the parents and the children, and his
helping to document issues against the father and failing to document issues
against the mother he became a willing participant in the conspiracy against
Mr. Cline.
LDS Social Services Worker, Stewart Karen was counseling Robert, when he
became aware of the Civil Conspiracy and became aware of DCFS workers
fraudulent miss-representations against Plaintiff. He was also a DCFS
worker. He worked as LDS Social Services at night. Shortly after the trouble
started with Chris Forsyth, Stewart Karen became aware of situations in which
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Defendant Julie Cline was abusing Robert. Bob Banta his DCFS employer
got involved and threatened to have him fired if he reported the abuse, which
would be a conflict of interest with DCFS's objective to discriminate against
Plaintiff. Again Stewart and others involved with this case may be enjoined
by Motion as a Doe, when all information becomes available.
DCSF worker was sent out to testify in a criminal trial against Defendant
Julie, that she had contacted a DCFS worker and he had given her permission
to take children away from Plaintiff, without a court order. Records will show
that Julie left for Heber on Thursday, before she claims to have talked to
'DCFS on Friday. DCFS record shows that Julie didn't contact DCFS until
the following Monday. In other words, DCFS was again conspiring to help
her keep the children by testifying falsely in a criminal trial. Even if actual
worker that testified is granted immunity, Other DCFS employees knew the
truth and did nothing to stop this and so will have supervisory liability
Other Torts Resulting from and in Coniunction with this Civil Conspiracy
There have been many torts committed in furtherance of this civil conspiracy.
Those include; Alienation of Affection, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of
process, Deceit, Fraud, Libel, Slander, Neglance, Withholding and or
manufacturing Evidence, Interference with a Business Relationship, Failure to
train employees in Civil Rights issues, Failure to Train Employees not to
commit Perjury, Failure to train Employees not to release confidential
information, peonage, and attempted extortion.
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73.

Third District Court and several Judges of third district court have been made
aware of the issues and have failed to afford Plaintiff his equal protection
under the law. As a result of this conspiracy, plaintiff has had rights to his
children taken away, virtually every saleable asset taken and given to
defendant Julie Camp, He is now has thousands of dollars in debt and virtually
no way to pay them. Court set Child Support without using state approved
chart. When Plaintiff went back to have Child Support adjusted after
additional children came to live with him, court stated that they now didn't
have enough income information to adjust Child Support. If they didn't have
enough information to adjust it downward, then they didn't have enough to set
it in the first place. He has been sentenced to thirty days in jail and served
most of them. Court is threatening to do it again. His credit is destroyed
mostly because of issues surrounding this illegal conspiracy. He will most
assuredly be forced to take out bankruptcy, neighbors friends and other people
including children school officials now treat Plaintiff differently because of
the extensive allegations that were spread around representing that plaintiff
was a child abuser. After the conspirators have destroyed plaintiffs business,
and he ends up living in his parents basement with two of his minor sons,
court is now stating if he doesn't get all his court ordered bills caught up, as
well as get himself his own place by August, that court will take Christopher
away from him also. This would be an incredible injustice not only to
Plaintiff, but also to Christopher and Robert as well.
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Defendant Judge Robert K. Hilder appointed Guardian ad Litem and Custody
Evaluator. Rules of Judicial conduct state that judge has obligation to ensure
that those with whom he appoints are held to same high standards as a Judge.
After it was made known to Judge Hilder, that Guardian ad Litem and
Custody Evaluator had both participated in conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff,
Judge refused to do anything to either of them. These are alleged to be
administrative functions and not judicial functions.
Specific Allegations of Fraud, Deceit and Abuse of Process
Fraudulent allegations of abuse in March 1, 2002 protective order. Fraudulent
allegations of loans made by Julie's parents. Fraudulent allegations that
Petitioner threatened Sharon Packer and Julie Cline at Genesis. Fraudulent
statements that Juvenal Court did not already have jurisdiction over and
hadn't awarded custody over Robert. Filing a protective order to get Plaintiff
out of the home when the night of the alleged incident and one night before
filing a protective order, Julie came over to Plaintiffs side of bead to say
prayers. Julie fraudulent stated that she was afraid. Fraudulent allegations
that Plaintiff had previously stalked and old boyfriend of Julies. Fraudulent
allegation that Plaintiff had violently shook Julie. Fraudulent statement that
Julie had not given Mr. Cline permission to bring sleeping children into the
home at time Plaintiff dropped them off. Julie and Sharon had a perfect
knowledge that the allegations were false and yet they made them anyway
with the intent to malign Mr. Clines good name and reputation, Destroy his
business interests, and to intentionally inflict emotional distress.
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Mr. and Mrs. Packer told Custody Evaluator that Plaintiff had committed
embezzlement. They were in court when Plaintiff explained that to Judge and
they knew the allegation was false. They used it to discredit plaintiff. Filing
of Stalking injunction by Mrs. Packer was abuse of process, as she knew her
allegations were false and or distorted. Filing of lawsuit by packers against
Plaintiff was abuse of process because they knew that Julie and Plaintiff had
both been told that they would be paid for mural when work was done at
packer home. Judge Eyer never ruled on the underlying claim of payment for
work done on the home but only ruled on the validity of the lien its-self.
Judge Eyer issued an order preserving other claims for plaintiff to be filed
later against packers. Filing of Contempt charges was deceit and abuse of
process as an agreement was made that if DCFS worker would help convict
Plaintiff by testifying fraudulently, that Julie and Steve would drop contempt
charges if Plaintiff would agree to stop going after DCFS and its workers.
This is alleged to be a conspiracy to deny first amendment rights of plaintiff to
right of redress against government. Steve Wall documented a one hour
conversation with Bob Banta and an attorney with the attorney generals office
to plan having Chris Forsyth perjure herself in court. At the end of the
contempt trial, Steve made offer in front of Judge Hilder to drop all contempt
charges if Plaintiff would drop any future claims against him, the packers,
Julie, DCFS and its workers. The fact that he negotiated on behalf of DCFS
and others evidences abuse of process and intent to use contempt to force
plaintiff to back off his claims for fraudulent child abuse allegations.
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Affidavit of April 1, 2003 by Julie Packer was fraudulent and many of the
accusations were totally false. Julie Knew that the allegations were totally
false and they were made to damage plaintiff in various ways. Statements by
Mrs. Packer to the effect that Mrs. Packer wasn't abused as a child were false.
Statements made that she hadn't abused Julie and no such Journal entry
existed were made knowing that they were false. Mr. Packer's denial of her
mother's alcoholism was also done with the knowledge that it was false.
Statements made in court and in letter supporting November 2003 protective
order that Mr. Cline had made false police reports were false. At December
12, 2003 Protective order hearing, Mr. Packer is caught on tape laughing
about the fact that she got her children to lie to police officers. In fact each
and every affidavit submitted by Julie, and the Packers had some lie and
fraudulent allegation.
Rule 60 B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for an independent
action to be filed for fraud upon the court. Since much of the fraud allegations
are Fraud Upon the Court, petitioner maintains that the fraud was extrinsic,
because Court orders were put in place to prevent Plaintiff from talking to the
children, Guardian ad Litem was supposed to represent the children and yet
she participated in the fraud. Specific details of what children actually told
CPS workers could not be discovered because of order not to talk to them. On
December 12, 2003, Court ordered Plaintiff to not communicate with Dr.
Malovich regarding details of custody evaluation, but put Michelle
Bloomquist in charge of doing that. Michelle Bloomquist filed motion to
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quash subpoenas in regards to children testifying, which was granted.
Plaintiff requested documents from Packers about their ownership of the
Laytham way home and Steve Wall refused to turn them over. Finally Mr.
Cline had prepared numerous pieces of evidence related to credibility of Julie
and her father, but court refused to hear them because they were related to
contempt filing and deceit and abuse of process. To date, almost 16 months
after filing of motion for contempt against Julie, court is still stalling Plaintiff
from bringing that evidence into court.
Alienation of Affection
Finally evidence will be presented to show that her mother Mrs. Packer
abused Defendant Julie Cline. Because of the abuse, Julie has a psychological
disorder in which she is unable to make decisions outside of the influence of
her mother. Mrs. Packer was also severely abused as a child and has an
incredible need to control everything and everyone around her. Mrs. Packer
was the mastermind and architect of all these illegal, tort actions. Mrs. Packer
put others up to doing her bidding for her, but she is ultimately responsible for
her illegal actions. Her ultimate goal was to alienate Plaintiff from his home,
associations with his wife and children and to destroy his business. She has
used her extensive wealth to influence others to join in this illegal civil
conspiracy, but the ultimate responsibility is hers and hers alone.
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Additional Claims Since Filing
Since the original claim was filed on March of 2005 and additional situation
of discrimination has occurred by Julie Cline, Sharon Packer, Wasatch County
Sheriffs office, Officer Zeila Thomas, and additional Doe's, DCFS and its
worker, Dean Evans, and additional Doe's, all designed to deprive Plaintiff of
additional constitutional rights. Currently Plaintiff is seeking damages based
upon 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986 against the state and
county workers. Because of the Utah governmental Immunity act which
requires advance notice against state workers, the notice will be given and
motion will be made to include the state protected portions of this situation in
this claim at a later time or claim will be brought in another action.
The situation began when Julie came to pick up minor child Christopher for
her weekend visitation with him on or about September 10, 2005. Christopher
did not want to go because he was mad at his mom because she frequently
fails to come get him for regular visitation. Mr. Cline informed Christopher
that Weekend visitation is mandatory by the court order and he was to go with
his mom. When he started to swear at her he threatened to punish hem if he
didn't stoop talking to her that way. Julie left with Chris. About 30 minutes
later she dropped him of in front of Petitioners home without even talking
with him about it. Julie then went to meet Mrs. Packer at Costco, where she
and her mother planed to again to make false allegations against Mr. Cline of
Child Abuse.
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Plaintiff informed Christopher that he was going to drop him off in Heber
because he doesn't think Chris Should get what he wanted by throwing a
temper in front of his mother. Julie found out and called Officer Thomas of
the Wasatch County Sheriffs office that she didn't want Christopher. Officer
Thomas got a hold of Plaintiff and informed him that if he brought Chris to
Heber that she would have plaintiff arrested for violating a protective order
and have his parental rights to Christopher terminated by DCFS. Plaintiff
explained to her that Chris was court ordered to be there and she was
interfering with a court order. He also told her that she was attempting to
violate plaintiffs liberty interest in the care and management of his children.
(UCA 62A-4a-201) She stated that she didn't care about either a court order
or Plaintiffs rights and she continued to threaten DCFS action against
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff started to Heber and called a dispatcher for the sheriffs office to tell
them that he was coming to get a report that Julie didn't want Chris. The
Dispatch said that she would have it when he got there. Upon arriving at the
sheriffs office, Mr. Cline was informed that they would give him a copy of
the report. Officer Thomas and other Sheriffs asked to make sure Christopher
was all right. Plaintiff took them to the car where they asked Chris to come
inside for a few minutes. After several discussions about getting the report
and Officer Reid interfering in Plaintiffs constitutional rights, officer Thomas
took Chris down the hall to question him. Plaintiff protested stating that he
had the right to be present during any questioning of his minor son. Plaintiff
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was then informed that he was a suspect. Upon asking what he was suspected
of Office Thomas refused to tell Plaintiff. Plaintiff then told everyone that he
was going to leave and was informed that he would be arrested for interfering
with an investigation. Again officers refused to inform him of what they were
investigating. Chris was then asked by on of the officers if he wanted to talk
to them and he declined. Officers still refused to let Plaintiff go. When they
finally told Plaintiff that they were investigating child abuse, Plaintiff
informed them that they lacked Jurisdiction to investigate a situation that
occurred in Salt Lake County. They still refused to let Plaintiff go. They took
Christopher in a separate care to the Children's Justice Center to be
interviewed by DCFS.
When Dean Evans of DCFS arrived he was also informed that he lacked
jurisdiction to interview Christopher and any investigation should be done in
Salt Lake County. He interviewed Chris anyway. After the interview he told
Plaintiff that Chris was not abused and let Plaintiff take Chris home.
A couple of days later Plaintiff called DCFS hotline and asked to speak to
DCFS worker in charge of investigation. Plaintiff also started a new
investigation against Julie for making multiple false reports to DCFS and for
emotional abuse for her rejecting Chris. Worker stated that she never would
have opened an investigation for the situation that had happened at Plaintiffs
home. She also counted multiple false reports made by Julie. To date DCFS
has never contacted Chris or Plaintiff to interview him.
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86.

In this situation Plaintiff was again denied constitutional rights to determine
appropriate situations for his children. Julie, Sharon and Police officers made
false allegations of abuse against him. In spite of lack of jurisdiction on both
the part of Sheriffs officers and DCFS they still conducted an illegal
investigation of Plaintiff. When they prevented Plaintiff from leaving it
constitute a false arrest without probable cause. There actions smack of
entrapment where they first take rights away illegally. When Plaintiff protests
then they that he is fighting them as a justification for there actions.

87.

This again presents evidence that it is a long standing principle that is known
to and acquiesced to by municipalities ant their employees to deny
constitutional rights to fathers in domestic situations.

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action
Punitive Damages
88.

Plaintiff reaffirms and realleges paragraphs 1 - 87 as though set forth fully
herein.

89.

It is clear that the Plaintiff(s) acted with malice and with intent to deceive.
Their actions are shocking and unconscionable. In an action in which they
were asked to make judgments on behalf of children, they have let their desire
to get gain and to protect those with whom much of their income comes from
interfere in their judgment. They have done things that will have a long
lasting negative impact upon the very children that defendant(s) have a charge
to protect. They have used the court system to destroy Plaintiff with
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malicious falsehoods. These should shock the conscious of the court.
Everyone in society that hears about these malicious actions should be
outraged. They have committed fraud upon Plaintiff, the Cline Children, the
State of Utah, and the very Court that should have stopped this. They
continue to perpetrate their malicious actions on Plaintiff and continue to
enjoin other state and municipal workers into there malicious actions.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Therefore Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:

1.

On the First Cause of Action that a Judgment for the amount of the
$5,000,000.00 or as value may reasonably be determined by the court be
entered. This should by paid in an amount to be determined by the court with
the most to be paid by Mrs. Packer, and the State of Utah, if the state is not
granted some type of immunity.

2.

On Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action that a judgment be entered for the sum
of $15,000,000.00 dollars or as may reasonably be proven at the time of trial..

3.

For Declaratory and Injunctive relief as follows:

4.

That all defendants be declared to have committed fraud upon the court, upon
Plaintiff and upon the Cline Children.

5.

That judgment in Divorce Case 024902228 DA Presided over by Judge Hilder
be overturned because of the fraud of several of the defendants in this case.
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6.

That an injunction against the State of Utah be granted ordering them to take
appropriate action against the various co-conspirators employed by the state
including suspension of licenses for at least one year for Dr. Malovich, and all
CPS workers involved in the action.

7.

Consideration should be given to ordering Michelle Bloomquist, Steve Wall
and Anthony Ferdon disbarred for their participation in an illegal conspiracy.

8.

That any of the co-conspirators that have been granted immunity from their
actions should be referred to the Federal Attorneys office for prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18 U.S.C. 242.

9.

Declare that Utah State Third District Court has violated Plaintiffs
Constitutional Rights to Due Process.

10.

Consideration should be given to ordering Judge Hilder to removing himself
from the bench and or being sanction by the Utah Bar.

11.

State should be ordered to re-work divorce laws, protective order laws and
child support laws to prevent them from being used to violate constitutional
rights of fathers.

12.

For reasonable Legal fees and other costs of bringing this action to court as
may be determined at a trial.

13.

For various costs of collection and other cost of enforcing the judgment.

14.

For interest on the indebted and Judgment as may be determined by the court
at the legal rate of interest.

15.

For any other specific relief as may be proven just as the court sees fit to
award.
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Dated: March _ th, 2005

Earl L Cline
Plaintiff Pro Se

STATE OF UTAH
County of SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Earl Lavere Cline, (Affiant), being sworn and under oath, depose and says that
Affiant is the Plaintiff in the above entitled action; that Affiant has read the foregoing
Claim, and understands the contents thereof and the same is true of Affiants own
knowledge, information and belief.

Earl L Cline, Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

Notary Public
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